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The Human in an Ecologically
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Jame Schaefer
Department of Theology, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract A theological model of the human is needed to prompt responsible
thinking about and acting within the physical world. Some basic components
for modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator appear in the teachings of
Thomas Aquinas. When appropriated cautiously and informed broadly by
contemporary scientific findings, this model provides a promising way of
thinking about humans in relation to other species and ecological systems, a
framework for acting responsibly, and the motivation for making this behavior
habitual.
Keywords Aquinas, cooperation, moral virtues, criteria for modeling,
theological anthropology, environmental ethics, sustainability.

Introduction
During this time of widespread ecological degradation, a
meaningful model of the human is needed to prompt responsible
thinking about and acting within the physical world. Many models
exist in the Christian tradition, but few have been explored for their
application to our ecological age besides imago Dei of Genesis 1,1
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Teilhard de Chardin’s homo faber,2 the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ preferred
“co-creator” and “stewards” duo,3 and Philip Hefner’s “created cocreator.”4 Among alternative models of the human is the virtuous
cooperator, the basic components of which appear in the teachings of
Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274 C.E.). When informed by contemporary
scientific findings, this model provides a promising way of thinking
theologically about the human in relation to other species and
ecological systems, a framework for acting responsibly, and the
motivation for making this behavior habitual. I am grateful for this
opportunity to bring the virtuous cooperator to the attention of
scholars.
I begin by identifying the criteria that must be met for modeling
the human today. An exploration of Aquinas’s notions about
cooperation and the chief moral virtues follows in which I indicate the
significance of his teachings for our time and the extensions that are
needed in order to be more responsive to environmental problems.
Subsequently, I test the virtuous cooperator against the criteria for
modeling humans and conclude in favor of this model.

Criteria for Modeling
Several criteria are pertinent to the task of developing a model
of the human during this ecologically destructive age.5 For a
theological model, the first and foremost criterion is that it should be
rooted in a religious faith tradition so it can be recognized, embraced
with confidence, and applied by people who profess that faith. The
more deeply embedded the model is in that religion’s primary texts,
doctrines, and teachings by eminent theologians, the more likely the
model may appeal to the faithful.
A second criterion for modeling the human for our time is the
need to be consistent with broad scientific findings about the physical
world. Theological discourse regarding the human must cohere with
knowledge gained through other modes of inquiry or run the risk of
being irrelevant and meaningless. When informed by the
contemporary sciences, a model of the human will assume that every
natural being existing today emerged from a common beginning about
fifteen billion years ago out of which heavy elements like carbon and
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iron were produced in the interiors of stars. This ensuing process
enabled the formation of at least one planet with the chemical
composition, temperature and radiation emission to bring about
replicating molecules that led eventually to complex and diverse
beings.6 Among them was at least one species able to reflect on the
history of its emergence from and with other species and to
recognize the radical human connection with all living and nonliving
beings that constitute the universe and especially Earth.7
That the model should be positively relational to other species
and physical systems is a third criterion. While an understanding of the
interconnection of humans and other past and present beings surfaces
when assuring the model’s consistency with contemporary scientific
findings, a metaphysical understanding of that relationship is also
crucial. A model of the human for our time must avoid dualistic
thinking that places humans over or apart from other beings and views
them merely as instruments to be used for whatever purposes a
human desires. Conversely, a model for our ecologically endangered
times must incorporate regard for humans as integral actors with nonhumans in ecological systems, respect for their mutual interests in
and needs for surviving, valuing of the distinct contributions they
make to the functioning of ecological systems, and appreciation for the
dependence humans have on the health and wellbeing of other
species, the air, the land and water.
A fourth criterion is that the model should outline at least
broadly the kind of behavior that is needed today. The more
descriptive the normative language is, the more effective the
model will be for guiding human actions.
Finally, the model should point to the motivation for bringing
about a change in the way people who profess a religious faith think
about and act toward the more-than-human others that constitute
Earth. This is a pivotal criterion because a model will most likely fail
unless the ultimate theological reason for bringing about a
transformation in attitude and behavior is explicit. From my experience
as a teacher with a past and present in environmental advocacy,
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this standard has been crucial for students in environmental ethics
course at Marquette University and for activists with whom I have
been working over the past three decades.

Aquinas on Cooperation – Four Types
Informed by a medieval understanding of the world as a
geocentric organism with fixed species created and ordered
hierarchically to one another by God,8 Aquinas reflected on the
cooperation among creatures and their cooperation with God. He used
variations of cooperator9 to convey four distinct but related types of
cooperation: (1) Creatures cooperate by acting or being acted
upon according to their God-given natures for their individual and
common good in conformity with the orderly world God created and
sustains in existence;10 (2) living creatures cooperate with God, their
primary cause for existing, by acting as secondary agents on other
creatures to carry out God’s plan for the universe;11 (3) God both
operates on and cooperates with humans for their temporal and
eternal good;12 and (4) humans cooperate with God’s grace by acting
on others in ways that achieve good in temporal life as they seek their
eternal good which is happiness with God.13 Occasionally he referred to
1 Cor 3.9, 1 Thes 3.2-5, and Rom 8.28 to support his notions.

Inter-Cooperation of Creatures
Aquinas’s teachings that creatures cooperate by acting or being
acted upon according to their natures reflected his understanding that
God created all animate and inanimate beings with specific capabilities
of fulfilling their purposes in relation to one another. From his
medieval perspective, the ascending order of creatures with some
material composition consisted of the four primary elements of air,
earth, water and fire, minerals and other mixed elements, plants,
irrational animals, and humans (ST 1.47.2).14 Primary elements serve
as the basic substrata for mixed elements, mixed elements provide
nourishment for plants, plants provide food for animals, and animals
as well as plants supply the physical needs of humans. Aquinas
referred to this arrangement as an order of conservation (SCG 3.22)
within which creatures cooperate to internally sustain the universe that
God created and maintains in existence. At least implicitly, this
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arrangement also constitutes an order of instrumentality in which
humans use plants and animals, animals use plants, and plants use
mixed elements for their sustenance.15 He lavished with superlatives
his descriptions of this orderly universe of cooperators, each of which
contributes something essential to the perfection of the universe16 and
all of which cooperate to achieve its internal common good.17 While he
considered some cooperators qualitatively better than others, primarily
because of their natures and capacities to act, and thought that
humans are superior to other material beings, because of the innate
human capacity to make informed decisions and act freely on them, he
concluded that the whole universe of cooperators is better than one or
several types of creatures.18
Of course, Aquinas’s depictions of the physical world’s
functioning were limited by his knowledge of the world that was
informed by the natural philosophy of his time. There are no
inklings in his works about the evolution of species that in turn account
for the human connection with other species over eons of time, about
their molecular similarities, or about the complex makeup and
synergistic effects of abiota and biota within ecological systems. Nor
did he convey any anticipation that human activities could accelerate
the extinction of species, destroy habitats, degrade ecological systems,
or threaten the integrity of the biosphere. Foundational to his 13th
century thinking was his faith that God created and sustains the
world’s capacity to maintain itself physically according to natural laws
God established to assure its functioning.19

Creatures’ Cooperation with God
That living creatures cooperate with God by acting on other
creatures has its basis in Aquinas’s thinking about God as the primary
cause of the universe of many diverse entities, including secondary
causes that act on others according to their natures.20 As the primary
cause of their existence, God endowed living creatures with capabilities
of acting on others to achieve their respective purposes as intended by
God.21 Plants acting on minerals and other mixed elements for their
nourishment, animals acting on plants for their food, and humans
acting on plants and animals for their temporal needs are God’s
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cooperators, by acting instrumentally on others to acquire what they
need for their sustenance and acting together to maintain the internal
functioning of the universe.22 By acting on others, secondary actors
enable those upon which they act to achieve their God-endowed
purposes for being in the universe.
Secondary agents are also God’s cooperators in a sacramental
sense by manifesting God’s goodness and wisdom.23 They manifest
God’s goodness and wisdom as individual types of creatures that
actively achieve their temporal purposes in relation to others according
to God’s intentions. However, the best manifestation of God’s
goodness and wisdom is the functioning of all secondary agents and
those acted upon as God intends.24
As cooperators among many different cooperators, humans
cooperate with God by acting freely according to the dictates of reason
to achieve what is good in their temporal lives that are supposed to be
geared toward achieving their eternal happiness with God.25 Whereas
other living creatures operate by instinct in determined patterns
through principles innate to their species,26 Aquinas reasoned from his
medieval understanding of the world, humans have the unique ability
among creatures to act by making informed decisions about how they
ought to be living in the world and to exercise their free wills in
deciding whether or not to act accordingly (SCG 3.78; ST 2|2.64.2).
Their decisions and actions are supposed to be conducive to the quest
for eternal life in God’s presence.27
Aquinas stressed repeatedly that humans should restrict their
actions on other creatures to acquiring the necessities of life and
knowing God as they seek their eternal goal (ST Supp. 91.1).28 When
acting on other creatures in these two ways that are appropriate to the
functioning of the universe, humans are God’s cooperators.29
The necessities of life are things humans need to support their
bodies, such as food, clothing, transportation (ST 2|2.141.6),30 and
those things without which they cannot carry on their lives in
appropriate ways as they seek eternal happiness with God (ST
1|2.4.7).31 He proscribed the exorbitant use of God’s other creatures,
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describing it as inordinate and wasteful (ST 2|2.83.6), immoderate (ST
2|2.169.1),32 disordered and vicious (SCG 4.83). The excessive
use of other entities was judged sinful in the scheme of the human
quest for eternity with God (ST 2|2.118.1).33
Aquinas’s teachings that humans can use other creatures to
know God reflect his sacramental perception of the physical world as a
means through which God’s goodness, wisdom, power and other
attributes can be contemplated (SCG 2.2).34 This teaching also reflects
his optimism that humans have been gifted by God with the capacity
to rise gradually from the world to limited knowledge of God, though
he expressed his sacramental view of the world in ways less emotive
than found in works by Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure and
Francis of Assisi.35 Physical beings can lead humans to God, Aquinas
contended, referring occasionally to Rom 1:20 and Wis 13, as long as
they start from their faith perspective that the
world is God’s creation and approach it as a means of knowing and
loving God (ST 1.65.1).36
That humans often fail to be cooperative concerned Aquinas.
Whereas other living and nonliving beings do not deviate from God’s
intentions, defective behavior occurs extensively among humans (ST
1.49.3). Their behavior is defective when they do not orient their
actions toward their temporal common good (ST 1|2.109.3),37 with a
view to their eternal good—God (ST 1.49.1-3).38 For Aquinas, the
more comprehensive the good envisaged by the human, the more the
human will corresponds to the will of God who wills the good of the
orderly universe (ST 1|2.19.10),39 and loves it with the highest kind of
love (DC 7).40 To show humans how to live a God-centered life, God
became incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ (ST 3.1-5).

God’s Grace Operating on and Cooperating with
Humans
To help individuals make and act on decisions to acquire
temporal goods in ways that cohere with the quest for eternal
happiness, God provides special care to individuals by giving them
grace (ST 1.22.2).41 God’s grace both operates on and cooperates with
humans toward their ultimate goal (DV 24.11, 27.5) without
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interfering in the human exercise of making and carrying out their
decisions freely.42 God’s grace operates lovingly on the human,
working on the human spirit to think about and act in ways that are
conducive to achieving eternal life (ST 1|2.110.1). God’s grace
cooperates with the human by actively sustaining the innate human
capacity to make informed decisions and to choose to act accordingly.
God’s grace also operates on and cooperates with humans to develop
moral virtues that will aid them in exercising their wills appropriately in
this life because they are motivated to achieve eternal life with God.43

Human Cooperation with God’s Grace–Living Virtuously
According to Aquinas, God created humans with the potential for
developing moral virtues that will assist them in acting appropriately
as God intends (ST 1|2.63.1).44 Prudence, justice, temperance and
fortitude are the chief moral virtues about which he wrote and from
which he identified an extensive system of virtues motivated by the
theological virtue of love for God and desire to enjoy eternal happiness
with God.45 The moral virtues are innate to the individual potentially
(ST 1|2.58.1).46 Like seeds in the ground, they are naturally present in
the human reason and must be cultivated (ST 1|2.63.1).47 Humans
cooperate with God’s grace by developing the virtues in themselves.
Once perfected, they confer an aptness to act correctly without
hesitation (ST 1|2.56.3).48

The Virtuous Cooperator
Aquinas taught that humans should be guided by the virtues
when acting on other creatures (SCG 1.92), since the moral virtues
incline them to follow informed decisions about relating to one another
and to other entities that constitute the orderly universe.49 Prudence
provides the rationale for acting on other living and nonliving beings in
appropriate ways (ST 1|2.57.4-6),50 while justice, temperance and
fortitude incline the human to act according to what prudence dictates.
These four virtues and their sub-virtues have significance for living
responsibly in our age of ecological degradation.
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Acting Prudently
Prudence is the habit of being discreet, Aquinas taught (ST
1|2.61.2). A prudent person chooses means of acting on other living
and nonliving beings through a process of taking counsel, forming a
good judgment, and commanding correctly (ST 1|2.65.1).51 Taking
counsel is an act of inquiry aimed at discovering the appropriate
means toward achieving a goal (ST 1|2.14.1, 57.6).52 Both the private
good of the individual and the common good of groups to which the
individual belongs are considered when seeking counsel. The good of
the individual is impossible, Aquinas argued, unless the common good
of others is assured (ST 2|2.47.10). Thus, the prudent individual
considers what is good for one’s self by being prudent about what is
good for many (ST 2|2.47.10).53 In the process of taking counsel from
informed sources, the human discerns what is needed to sustain one's
life, the life of one's neighbor, and the community to
which the person belongs. Judgment is made subsequently on the
means most applicable for acting on other beings for the purpose of
acquiring what is needed for human sustenance (ST 2|2.47.8,
1|2.57.6). Command, the chief and final act in prudent decisionmaking, requires three considerations that have special significance for
environmental ethics today: foresight, circumspection and caution (ST
2|2.47.8).54 Foresight assures that what is commanded in the present
is fitting for the future (ST 2|2.49.6, 55.7). Circumspection facilitates
the choice of suitable means to an end in light of a combination of
circumstances that may arise (ST 2|2.49.7). Caution is required to
avoid evil through a firm understanding of good (ST 2|2.49.8).
While this stepwise exercise of prudence does not absolutely
assure that the action chosen will be successful for the reasons
intended, Aquinas explained, the habit of making prudent decisions
lessens the uncertainty of the outcome (ST 2|2.49.5). To habitually
choose correct means of acting requires the development of this virtue
through instruction and experience over a long period of time (SCG
3.122).55 This framework for the exercise of prudence suggests a
systematic approach to addressing environmental problems that is
theologically motivated by the desire to cooperate with God.
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Acting with Moderation
The virtue of temperance inclines the human to act according to
what prudence dictates by curbing irrational desires and passions for
bodily pleasures and material goods things that are contrary to reason
(ST 1|2.65.1, 60.5).56 Since God intended that they serve as means
for sustaining human life while ultimately seeking eternal happiness
with God, the individual should not take excessive pleasure in them for
themselves or they will distract the individual from spiritual things that
lead to God (ST 2|2.141.5-6). These temporal needs fall into two
classifications according to Aquinas: (1) things without which humans
as individuals and as a species cannot survive; and, (2) things without
which humans cannot carry on their lives in appropriate ways (ST
2|2.141.6). While bodily survival needs can be ascertained from
Aquinas’s works and fits well with his overall notion of the consumptive
order of creatures that sustains them and the internal functioning of
the universe, exactly what he meant by things beyond these
necessities is somewhat obscure. They go beyond purely physical
requirements and extend to the ownership of external things, including
a moderate amount of material wealth that is determined when
considering the place, time and manners of those with whom the
person lives (ST 2|2.141.6).
In light of Aquinas’s emphasis on the virtue of temperance as a
guide toward controlling the desire for material goods, excessive
standards of living would seem to be precluded in any setting to avoid
deflecting attention from the ultimate desire for eternal happiness with
God. He endorsed poverty cautiously and restrictively, since he
thought it an extraordinary way of perfecting one’s life as a Christian.
He also insisted that a person who adopts poverty should retain the
ability to secure the necessities of life in a lawful manner.57

Acting Justly
The virtue of justice inclines the human to relate to living and
nonliving entities in ways that are conducive to achieving the temporal
common good of humans (ST 2|2.61.2, 58.5) as they seek their
ultimate end in God. All members of a community stand in relation to
it as parts to the whole, he taught repeatedly, and the good of the
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individual should be directed to the common good of the community
(ST 2|2.58.5-9, 1|2.19.10). Because the community’s temporal good
is to have sufficient means through which its members can sustain
their lives, the human would be inclined by the virtue of justice to use
living and nonliving beings in ways that assure their availability to
meet the needs of all humans in that community. An individual who
possesses or desires to possess immoderate amounts of material
goods sins against another, since one individual cannot have an
abundance of external riches without other individuals lacking them
(ST 2|2.118.1).
Since Aquinas considered humans as members of various kinds
of communities--households, states and the universe (DP 5.6), his
thinking provides an opening for construing the virtue of justice as
inclining humans to use goods of the Earth in ways that assure their
availability to meet the needs of other humans now and into the
future. Furthermore, because the common good of the human
community would be jeopardized by the degradation of the air, land
and water, the accelerated rate of species extinction, the destruction
of habitats, and damage to the biosphere,58 possibilities of which
Aquinas was evidently unaware, the virtue of justice could be
construed today as inclining humans individually and collectively to
relate to other biota and abiota in ways that do not jeopardize the
functioning of natural systems in the interests of human communities
near and far, now and into the future.
An even more expansive and ecologically sensitive role for
justice is suggested from Aquinas’s teaching that the more
comprehensive the good envisaged by the human, the more the
human will corresponds to the will of God who wills the good of the
whole universe (ST 1|2.19.10).59 God is the exemplar for humans to
follow by acting in ways that are geared toward the good of all natural
entities (SCG 3.24, 2.45-46). As creatures endowed with intellectual
capacities to discern appropriate actions and to choose to act
accordingly, humans would be inclined by the virtue of justice to act
for the common good of the entire corporeal world. Of course, because
the human is, according to Aquinas, the end of all corporeal things in
the orderly universe, acting primarily in the interest of the common
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good of the universe would concurrently be acting in the interests of
the human species.
As one of two particular types of justice, commutative justice
would incline humans individually and collectively to give to another
the temporal goods that are due to that individual (ST 2|2.61.1, 4).
Among these permissible goods is personal property, but only to the
extent that it enables the individual to meet life's needs and is cared
for in ways that make it possible to aid others who do not have
sufficient goods with which to meet their needs (ST 2|2.58.1).
Distributive justice directs the community to assure that the individual
receives a fair share of the common goods of the community that is
proportionate to the importance of the individual's position in that
community (ST 2|2.61.1, 63.2). Receiving a fair share of the
community's common goods assures that the individual has sufficient
goods with which to live a virtuous life as part of the community, but
not at the expense of meeting the needs of others in that community.
Both types of justice provide a basis for collective action aimed at
assuring that human needs are met now and into the future. Meeting
these needs would be dependent upon maintaining the availability of
natural goods upon which humans rely for their sustenance.
Explicit extensions of Aquinas’s teachings on the virtue of
general justice and the two particular types of justice are warranted
today in light of contemporary scientific findings about the human
place in the cosmological-biological continuum and the human
dependence on other than humans for sustenance. Justice should be
accorded generally to other species, ecological systems, and the
biosphere of Earth as essential parts of the community of the universe
whose interests in sustainable functioning should be considered.
Explicit extensions of the distributive and commutative forms of justice
are also needed to assure that humans recognize and respect the
needs of other cooperators and avoid actions that impede them from
satisfying their needs.

Acting Steadfastly Courageous
The virtue of fortitude enables the individual to persevere in
relating appropriately to other living and nonliving entities despite
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impediments that weaken the individual’s virtuous cooperation with
them (ST 2|2.123.2-3).60 Fortitude reinforces justice to incline humans
individually and collectively to seek the good of other humans now and
into the future. Fortitude supports temperance so it inclines humans to
use other corporeal things for the necessities of life and to know God
rather than for pure pleasure or pride of ownership (ST 1|2.68.4).
Fortitude strengthens prudence to persist in inclining humans in their
efforts to discern the best ways of relating to other living and nonliving
entities that constitute Earth.
Fortitude can be appropriated today as the virtue that will
strengthen humans individually and collectively to persist in using the
goods of Earth minimally with a view to the internal sustainability of
ecological systems and the biosphere. This is an especially important
point to stress among the middle-income to affluent faithful in both
industrially developed and developing countries. Though Aquinas
considered this virtue to incline humans to be steadfast, despite fear
and other passions that may impede their acting according to the
dictates of prudence (ST 1|2.61.2), fortitude could also be construed
today as fortifying human resolve to take protective and remedial
actions for fear of real or potential adverse effects that human actions
cause on other species, their habitats, and ecological systems.

Meeting the Modeling Criteria
Does the virtuous cooperator meet the five criteria that are
essential to model the human during our age of ecological
degradation? Many advantages surface to make this model promising
for people who profess their faith in God.

Rooted in the Tradition
While thinking about the human as a virtuous cooperator is
rooted in the Christian faith through efforts of one of its most eminent
theologians, this model has languished for centuries and needs airing
for consideration by the faithful today. Finding the components of this
model in Aquinas’s thinking should command the attention of many
within the Christian and other traditions who have inherited or at least
respect his synthesis of Judeo-Christian thinking with the best of Greek
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philosophy. His appeal may be especially strong for Roman Catholics
because he is revered as a “Doctor of the Universal Church”, a saint
who may have been the first person canonized for being a theologian
and teacher (Pieper 1962: 17), a scholar and priest whose methods,
doctrines and principles were required by the Codex Juris Canonica to
be taught to candidates for the priesthood (Pieper 1962: 18), and a
profound thinker who stimulated numerous strains of systematic
theology. As Karl Rahner (1983: 7), one of the great Roman
Catholic theologians of the twentieth century, remarked about
Aquinas's overall appeal:
I believe that even today Thomas still remains, in a quite special
and unique sense, a theologian of such magnitude that he must
not cease to have a place in our discussions.
His notions about the human as a virtuous cooperator should be
considered when searching for a meaningful and relevant way to
respond to the ongoing degradation of God’s creation.
Support from the Catholic tradition for thinking about humans
as cooperating with God’s grace can also be found in the theological
conclusions of the Council of Trent (1545-1563). In the context of the
Reformation and Martin Luther’s teachings about justification by faith
alone, the Council (1941: 31-34) explained the need for individuals to
consent to and cooperate with God’s grace in the process of seeking
eternal salvation. More recent support comes from Pope John Paul II
(1991: #59) who laments the failure of humans to cooperate with
God’s grace61 and urges their collaboration to avoid development
strategies that fail to respect other beings or jeopardize the planet’s
integrity (1991: #37).62
Retrieving the virtuous cooperator model from Aquinas’s
teachings also provides the advantage of distinguishing between God’s
activity and human activity, a criticism leveled against the “co-creator”
model.63 For the monotheistic traditions, the use of terminology to
exemplify how we ought to act must avoid confusing or misleading the
faithful.
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Consistent with Contemporary Scientific Findings
While Aquinas’s understanding of the physical world differs
vastly from ours, there is some resonance between his metaphysical
thinking about humans as cooperators among many other cooperators
that internally sustain the physical world with ecologists' findings about
the cooperative interactions of the air, land, water and living beings
that sustain ecological systems. So, too, does his hierarchical thinking
about humans as cooperators among various cooperators who act on
others for their sustenance cohere generally with scientific
observations about the food chain.64 Some consistency may also be
found between contemporary scientific findings about the intellectual
capacity of the human and Aquinas’s understanding of the human as a
rational cooperator who can contemplate various courses of action,
make informed decisions, and choose among them.
Of course, his 13th century works do not convey, nor should
they be expected to, any inkling of scientific evidence obtained
centuries later that the human species emerged out of and with other
species in a cosmological-biological continuum, that the DNA
compositions of humans and other species account in part for affinities
and disparities in their actions, or that the interconnections and
interdependencies of species, the air, land and water are highly
complex ecological systems of which they are parts. However, his faith
perspective that God created and sustains in existence the internally
self-maintaining world does not conflict with these contemporary
scientific findings,65 though his metaphysical framework for thinking
about species as “fixed” from the beginning of time is inappropriate for
our time.
Modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator is also consistent
with ongoing discussions about the sustainability of the planet among
natural and social scientists and leaders of nations and nongovernmental organizations. They have been striving for two decades
to define sustainable development in order to identify realistic ways in
which Earth’s dynamic physical systems can be sustained while
developing countries strive to industrialize their economies and
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industrialized countries continue to advance their economic wealth.66
How humans ought to use other species, the air, land and water is
crucial to this discussion.

Positive Relationship to Other Species and Physical
Systems
The virtuous cooperator developed from Aquinas’s thinking is
positively relational to other species, their habitats and ecological
systems. Grounded physically in the mutual needs of all beings to
sustain themselves and thereby sustain the functioning of ecological
systems and the biosphere, the virtuous cooperator will assume a
posture of humility before other-than-humans for the late arrival of the
human species in the unfolding universe, the dependence humans
have on other beings for human health and well-being, the havoc that
humans have caused to other species and ecological systems, and the
technological power with which humans are equipped to destroy Earth.
The virtuous cooperator will aim to manage human activities so they
are not degrading or destructive of other species, their habitats,
ecological systems or the biosphere, recognizing that they are capable
of managing themselves.67 The virtuous cooperator will view other
beings as cooperators essential to the functioning of systems of which
they are parts. The virtuous cooperator will be concerned about the
interests that other species, habitats, ecological systems and the
biosphere have for surviving and strive to avoid impeding their efforts.
Virtuous cooperators will be eco-centric in their daily activities
because they are centered on God who created, sustains and beckons
forth the further unfolding of the universe. Virtuous cooperators will
also appreciate their distinctive capabilities in relation to other
cooperators and accept responsibility for functioning in relation to
them in ways that are conducive to their well-being.
In addition to this positive relational attitude toward other
species and physical systems, the virtuous cooperator model provides
a unique aesthetic dimension. Clothed in a sacramental sensitivity
toward the physical world that Aquinas shared with other theologians
before, during and after his time, the virtuous cooperator will be
inclined to revere other humans, members of other species, their
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habitats, and the fragile biosphere. They will not be considered sacred
in themselves, however, as held by some world religions. Instead, the
virtuous cooperator will relate reverently to other physical beings
because they mediate God’s presence and character.

Descriptive Behavior
The virtuous cooperator model provides the framework for
behavior that is needed during this age of ecological degradation.
Being habitually prudent, just, moderate and courageous are the
basic behavioral characteristics of the virtuous cooperator. Each virtue
should be encouraged in young children and developed by the
individual until virtuous behavior becomes consistently characteristic of
that person. Individual cooperators should be cognizant of the need to
cooperate with one another to bring about collective virtuous activity
at appropriate levels of communities to which they belong–family,
neighborhood, municipality, county, state, federal and international,
not remanding to the next collective level what can be accomplished
on a more local level in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity.68
Guided by the virtue of prudence, the virtuous cooperator will
make informed decisions and act accordingly in relation to individuals
of other species, the air, the land and bodies of water in their mutual
interests of sustaining themselves, sustaining the dynamic functioning
of the ecosystems of which they are parts, and maintaining the
integrity of Earth. The virtuous cooperator will apply a stepwise
process of discovering the best possible courses of action based on the
data that are available, choosing one that is compatible with the wellbeing of all affected in the present and future, and enacting that
decision cautiously when considering the circumstances and
contingencies that could arise. The virtuous cooperator will be open to
appropriating and applying the “precautionary principle” that was
adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992 and calls upon governments to institute
protective measures even when a definitive cause-effect relationship
on a problem has not been identified.69
The virtuous cooperator will be guided by the virtue of
temperance to limit the use of other species and abiota to the
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necessities of life, cognizant of their needs for flourishing as essential,
interacting components of ecological systems. The virtuous cooperator
will concurrently approach them as means through which God’s
presence can be experienced and God’s character can be
contemplated. From this sacramental perspective, the virtuous
cooperator will encounter individuals of other species, their habitats,
and vistas of land, sea and sky cautiously to avoid degrading their
capacities to mediate God, endeavor to preserve species and ecological
systems so they continue to mediate God’s presence and character in
the future, react with restraint when individuals of other species
threaten the health, domicile and of humans, and work to enable the
identification and implementation of rationales for relating to ecological
systems and the larger biosphere so their harmonious functioning can
reflect God’s empowering character.
Informed by the natural sciences and particularly by
evolutionary biology and ecology, virtuous cooperators will extend
Aquinas’s initial model to include a sub-virtue of temperance--humility
(ST 2|2.161.1, 6) toward other-than-humans. Incorporating humility
into a model of the human is essential to recognize that humans had
their bodily possibilities begun in the furnaces of stars, emerged from
and with other entities in the cosmological-biological continuum, and
are radically dependent upon other types of animate and inanimate
beings for their bodily wellbeing.
Guided by the virtue of justice, the virtuous cooperator will use
the goods of Earth in ways that strive to assure their availability to
meet the needs of other humans near and far, now and into the
future. The needs of the most vulnerable and politically powerless will
be met. Non-renewable sources will not be depleted by some at the
expense of others. The functioning of natural systems will not be
degraded or destroyed in order to avoid adverse effects on others
in the present or future. Personal property will be managed in ways
that make it possible to aid others who do not have sufficient goods
with which to meet their needs in life.
The virtuous cooperator will also be open to extending Aquinas’s
notion of justice from acting justly toward other humans within the
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human community to acting justly toward all biota, recognizing their
needs for sustaining themselves within their habitats, and toward all
components of ecosystems so their functioning is not disrupted by
human activities. The virtuous cooperator will work with other virtuous
cooperators at social, economic and political levels, following the
principle of subsidiarity, to bring about justice for all species and
ecological systems.
Finally, fortitude will guide the virtuous cooperator to be
steadfastly prudent, temperate and just when relating to other species
and ecological systems, despite fatigue, cynicism, failure to bring
about immediate change, and social rebuffs when deviating from selfcentered societal values. The virtuous cooperator will also be propelled
to stand firm in opposing the loss of biodiversity, the degradation and
destruction of ecosystems, and damage to the ozone layer due
to fear of present and future consequences.
Identification of Religious Motivation
Because the motivation behind acting virtuously in this life is
love for God and the desire to spend eternal happiness in God’s
presence, the virtuous cooperator meets the final criterion for
modeling the human in our ecologically endangered age. Those who
profess faith in God, believe in the promise of everlasting happiness
with God, and want to gear their lives accordingly are offered a
compelling model. Appropriated from Aquinas’s works and extended
to reflect contemporary scientific findings about the world, this model
explains why humans should act prudently, justly and moderately with
firm resolve. Modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator makes this
ultimate reward explicit.
Moreover, this model of the human provides assurance that
individuals will be able to become virtuous cooperators. In Aquinas’s
thinking, God offers humans the grace they need to develop the moral
virtues until their aptness to act steadfastly with prudence, justice and
moderation is habitual. God provides this supernatural aid out of love
for humans and for the whole world that God loves with the highest
kind of love. God’s grace operates on humans to facilitate their resolve
to live in ways that are geared ultimately toward their goal of
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everlasting happiness in God’s presence. The grace of God also
cooperates with humans so that they use their capabilities to the
fullest extent to develop virtuous behavior toward the more-thanhuman beings that constitute God’s Earth.

Conclusions
Aquinas’s teachings about cooperation and the chief moral
virtues provide some basic components for constructing the virtuous
cooperator as a model for the human that is needed during our
ecologically endangered age. When appropriated within an
evolutionary view of the world and informed by contemporary scientific
findings, the virtuous cooperator meets the five criteria posited for
modeling the human today. The virtuous cooperator is rooted in the
Christian faith tradition with special significance for Roman Catholics
and others who respect Thomas Aquinas’s synthesis of JudeoChristianity and Greek philosophy. The virtuous cooperator coheres
with broad scientific findings about the physical world when
acknowledging the cooperative interactions of diverse biota and abiota
that constitute ecological systems, the food chain through which
species feed hierarchically on one another to sustain themselves, and
human place in the biological-cosmological continuum. The virtuous
cooperator is positively relational to other species and physical
systems by positing humans as integral actors within ecological
systems, rather than over or apart from them, and by celebrating the
unique human capacities to identify, reflect upon and choose to
implement options for acting responsibly on other-than humans. The
virtuous cooperator outlines the kind of human behavior that is helpful
today by acting prudently through a stepwise process of making
informed decisions, using other goods of Earth moderately for actual
needs and for thinking about God, acting justly by considering the
needs of other humans now and into the future and assuring that their
needs are met within the context of achieving the common good of all
beings, and remaining steadfast about living virtuously despite fears of
social pressures and in light of fears of ecological destruction that will
affect humans now or in the future. Finally, the virtuous cooperator
stipulates the religious motivation for acting virtuously in relation to
more-than-humans, a motivation that is no less than love for God and
desire to spend eternity in God’s presence.
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While this model needs further refinement, especially to extend
the notion of justice to more-than-human species, ecological systems
and the biosphere, the virtuous cooperator warrants consideration
among others that have been proffered. I welcome comparisons of the
virtuous cooperator with the imago Dei, homo faber, “co-creator”,
“steward”, and “created cocreator” models. I also encourage the
retrieval of other models from the Christian tradition so all promising
possibilities are available for the faithful to consider and embrace
during our age of ecological degradation.

Notes
Among the most notable efforts to define imago Dei as recorded in Genesis 1
and to make the model meaningful and relevant for our ecological age
are Hall’s (1986) and Gunton’s (1991: 47-61).
2
Problems with the homo faber model in an age of technological abuse are
identified perceptively by several scholars, including Teilhardian
specialist Berry (1982) and moral theologian French (1990).
3
On “co-creator” and “steward” models juxtaposed, see the United States
Catholic Conference (1991) and Ashley (1985). For reactions to the cocreator model as appropriated by some authors from Pope John Paul
II’s early writings, the essays in Houck and Williams (1983) are
helpful. Among the many explorations of the “steward” model, Hall’s
(1987, 1990) is especially well grounded and developed.
4
Hefner (1993) developed this impressive model to distinguish human from
divine activity.
5
These criteria parallel roughly Barbour’s (1997: 113 and 158-9) criteria for
assessing scientific theories and expressions of religious faith and
Rausch’s (1993: 19-20) criteria for theological statements.
6
See Polkinghorne’s (1987: 56) synopsis.
7
McFague (1993: 27) summarizes poignantly our “common creation story”
with all beings: “At some level and in a remote or intimate way,
everything is related to everything else. We are distant relatives to the
stars and kissing cousins with the oceans, plants, and other creatures
on the earth.”
8
For example, see SummaeTheologiae (hereafter cited as ST) 1.47.2, 76.3,
and Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG) 2.68 and 3.71. Aquinas
reasoned from his faith perspective that God created and ordered the
many diverse, essential and valuable types of beings to one another
because they are ordered ultimately to God, an arrangement that he
described in De Veritatis (hereafter DV) 5.1 and 3 as a two-fold order
1
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of beings. Also see De Potentia (hereafter DP) 3.7.9, ST 1.21.1, SCG
3.112, Compendium Theologiae (hereafter CT) 148, and Wright’s
(1957: 30-113) insightful exploration.
9
The Index Thomisticus identifies 286 entries of these usages of cooperator:
20 regarding the cooperation of creatures; 106 on their cooperation
with God; 45 in which humans cooperate freely with God or God’s
grace; and, 115 on divine grace operating on humans and cooperating
with human actions.
10
See, for example, ST 1.61.3, 111.2, 1|2.9.1 and 19.10, DV 9.2 and 27.5, CT
124, and SCG 1.70, 3.21 and 69-70.
11
When God works through secondary causal agents, Aquinas taught in ST
1.105.5, for example, the innate efficacy of their causal powers is left
absolutely intact. God's activity in them does not displace or obviate
their actions; it sustains and guides their actions lovingly toward their
ultimate end. Aquinas perceived God's employing secondary causes to
govern other creatures as a way of communicating the dignity of
causality to creatures as indicated, for example, in ST 1.23.8 and
explained by Gilson (1956: 184). In SCG 3.21, Aquinas cites (pseudo)
Dionysius and 1 Cor 3.9 to support his thinking that creatures
operating on others according to the innate characteristics given to
them by God are Dei cooperatorem.
12
For example, see DV 27.5. Also see ST 1.105.4-5 for Aquinas’s
understanding of God’s will acting on rational creatures.
13
According to Aquinas in DV 24.11 and 27.5, God offers grace to humans to
enable their cooperation with God’s intention that they seek the
temporal good in this life while aiming for eternal happiness.
14
Also see SCG 2.68 where Aquinas graded creatures according to their
operations or capacities for acting, beginning with inanimate elements
followed by mixed bodies, and the animate souls of plants, irrational
animals, and rational animals. In ST 1.48.2, he graded creatures
according to their incorruptible to corruptible properties as heavenly
bodies, angels, humans, animals, plants, minerals and mixed bodies,
and the primary elements; see also ST Supp. 91.5 and SCG 3.71.
Occasionally he described them metaphorically as a ladder of forms
(e.g., SCG 2.68).
15
Blanchette (1992: 256) recognizes in Aquinas’s work an order of
instrumentality among corporeal beings. However, Aquinas’s thinking
seems more expansive and inclusive of the totality of reality since he
also considered God’s providential actions as somewhat instrumental
when moving beings toward their end in God (e.g., SCG 3.100 and DP
3.7, 5.9) and humans’ using one another (e.g., SCG 3.128, ST 1.96.4
and 2|2.47.10). See Weisheipl (1974: 206).
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In SCG 2.39 and 44, Aquinas described this orderly arrangement as the
greatest good of the universe, in ST 1.15.2 as its highest good, in SCG
2.45 and CT 102 as the ultimate and noblest perfection, and in SCG
3.71 as the highest beauty. Wright (1957: 87) summarizes Aquinas’s
thinking about the universe as “God’s masterpiece”. Also see
Blanchette’s (1992) indispensable philosophical analysis of Aquinas’s
thinking about the perfection of the universe.
17
The common good of the universe is its integrity, which results from the
order and composition of all its parts, Aquinas explained in SCG 3.94;
see further DP 1.6.1 and ST 1.115.3.
18
For example, see SCG 1.85, DP 1.6.1 and ST 1.103.7.
19
As Copleston (1955: 142) explained, Aquinas believed that every finite
entity depends existentially on God at every moment of its existence;
if the divine conserving or sustaining activity were withdrawn, it would
immediately cease to exist.
20
For example, see Aquinas’s discussions in ST 1.105.5, SCG 3.67 and DP 3.7.
21
For example, see ST 1.44.3-4 and 47.1 and SCG 3.16-20. For his
understanding of God’s primary activity and creatures secondary
causality, see SCG 3.17, CT 103 and 123-124. In SCG 3.69, he
described the actions of secondary agents as a likeness to God who
communicates goodness to creatures, and he taught in CT 124, for
example, that goodness proliferates in the universe when the more
richly endowed creature cooperates to procure the good of many.
22
Aquinas taught in ST 1.61.3, SCG 1.70 and 3.69 that the interactions of
creatures in the orderly universe benefit the entire universe.
23
For example, see ST 1.65.2 and SCG 2.45.
24
For example, see ST 1.47.1, SCG 2.45, and DP 3.16.
25
For example, see ST 1|2.3.6-8 and 1|2.180.4. See further SCG 4.55 on
Aquinas’s teachings that the ultimate end of humans is their eternal
union with God, a union that is enabled by God’s incarnation, death
and resurrection in the person of Jesus the Christ.
26
For example, see CT 74, 127 and 148, SCG 3.7 and 111-12, and ST 1.96.1.
27
For example, see SCG 1.92, 3.17-25 and 145, ST 2|2.118.1 and CT 173.
28
Also see ST 1|2.4.6-7, 114.10, 2|2.76.2, 83.6 and 118.1, SCG 3.22, and CT
173.
29
Aquinas considered the human use of other creatures for the necessities of
life and knowing God as an exercise of natural dominion; see, for
example, ST 2|2.66.1-2, CT 74, 127 and 148, SCG 3.78 and 111-112.
In ST 2|2.66.1, he insisted that God retains absolute dominion over
both users and used.
30
See also ST Supp. 91.1, 2|2.64.1 and 83.6, and SCG 3.22, 121, 129 and
131. The prescription that humans are intended to use only what is
16
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needed to sustain human life and not what is desired beyond the
necessities of life resounds throughout his works.
31
Also see ST 2|2.83.6, 118.1 and 141.6.
32
For his understanding of the appropriate use of things by humans, see SCG
3.129. Some uses for the necessities of life are naturally fitting, he
taught, whereas as immoderate uses are naturally unfitting in the
scheme of the integrity of the universe and, ultimately, in the human
quest for God.
33
See further ST 2|2.83.6 and SCG 4.83.
34
The sacramental quality of the world was explored frequently in patristic and
medieval theological discourse as indicated by Schaefer (2001: 3790).
35
For example, see SCG 4.1, 3.47, ST 1.65.l and 2|2.180.4.
36
See further ST 2|2.180.4 and Supp. 91.1.
37
See further ST 1|2.77.4 and 87.3, SCG 3.6 and 9, DP 3.6, and DV 24.11.
38
Also see ST 1|2.19.10 and 87.3, SCG 3.6 and 9, De malo (hereafter DM)
1.1, and DP 3.6.
39
Also see SCG 3.94, DP 1.6.1, and ST 1.115.3.
40
See De Caritate (hereafter DC) 7 where Aquinas taught that God loves the
orderly universe through which all creatures are ordered ultimately to
God more than God loves the human or any other type of creature. In
SCG 3.64, he explained that, among created beings, God cares most
for the order of things established in relation to one another to
constitute the universe.
41
Also see SCG 3.112-13 and DV 1.5.6-7. According to Aquinas, God’s special
care is needed for individual humans who have the capacity to think
about how to act and to choose to act, capacities that humans often
misuse. This special divine care for individual humans contrasts with
God’s general care for other species because they do not have
intellectual capabilities or free will with which to deviate from God’s
intentions. God’s care for individual humans and other species should
be considered in relation to Aquinas’s teaching in SCG 3.64 that
among God’s creation God cares most for the order of all things that
constitute the universe.
42
This follows his rationale that God governs all things to their end through
God’s eternal law, which God imposed on the universe in the form of
natural law; see, for example, ST 1|2.91.1, 93.1-5, and DV 5.1.6. On
his thinking about rational creatures who are ruled by eternal law and
are rulers of themselves to whom God gives grace to seek their
ultimate end, see ST 1|2.109.1 and SCG 3.1.
43
See, for example, ST 1.111.2 and DV 27.5.
44
Also see ST 1|2.55.1-3 and 56.4.
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For Aquinas's understanding of the theological virtue of love ex caritate as
motivating the moral virtues, see, for example, ST 2|2.23-23025 and
DC 3 and 7.
46
Also see ST 1|2.50.3 and 63.1.
47
Also see ST 1|2.55.1-3.
48
See his discussion in ST 1|2.68.3-4 on the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits
whereby the human is perfected to obey the Holy Spirit readily in
comparison with the moral virtues that dispose the human to obey
what reason dictates.
49
On the role of the virtues in relation to informed decision-making, see ST
1|2.58.3, 62.1, 64.1, 66.3, 68.8, 100.1, 2|2.47.6 and 161.5.
50
Also see ST 1|2.58.4 and 2|2.47.7.
51
Also see ST 1|2.57.4-6, 2|2.47.2 and 8.
52
Also see ST 2|2.47.1-2 and 8.
53
Also see ST 1.22.1 where Aquinas discussed God’s providence as prudence
by ordering all things in the universe to their ends which serves to
underscore the need for humans to reason correctly by ordering all
their actions toward their ultimate end in God.
54
Also see ST 2|2.47.9 and 1|2.57.6.
55
Any person who has the ability to reason is competent to have prudence in
proportion to the person's rationality, he explained in ST 2|2.47.12.
56
This does not mean that Aquinas thought that the passions are evil. As
stipulated in ST 2|2.141.6, they are good aspects of being human so
long as they are controlled by the dictates of reason. See further ST
2|2.141.1-5.
57
See SCG 3.132-133, ST 2|2.184.3-4, 7 and 186.3. Aquinas chose poverty
as a way of life when joining the fledgling Dominican Order of
Preachers and leaving behind his family’s relatively wealthy lifestyle,
as Weisheipl (1974: 131) explained.
58
See, for example, SCG 3.64.
59
See also SCG 3.24 where he explains that the more perfect something is in
its capabilities to act, the more it desires and acts for the common
good. Creatures that are incapable of making informed decisions tend
to seek their own individual good whereas the more perfect act for the
good of their species, the even more perfect act for the good of their
genus, and God, the most perfect, who acts for the good of the entire
created world.
60
See further ST 2|2.123.11, 141.3, and 1|2.61.4.
61
For example, see John Paul II (1991: #59).
62
See also John Paul II (1987: #34) and (1989: #7-9). The Pope frames his
concerns in the interests of human persons now and into the future
and considers human labor as a participation in God’s creative activity
(1991: #32 and 37; 1981: #25), which led some scholars to
45
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characterize his model of the human person as a “co-creator”. For a
constructive response to the Pope’s critics, see Vacek, (1990: 81-107).
63
See Vacek (1990: 81-107), essays in Houck and Williams (1983), and
Pawlikowski (1998: 8-11).
64
See O'Neill et al. (1986: 30), King (1993: 19-46), and Allen and Starr
(1982).
65
As Aquinas taught in ST 1.1.1 and scholars working in the burgeoning field
of religion and science contend today, theology and the natural
sciences do not conflict when they are practiced according to their
distinct data, methods, purviews and limitations. Together they
provide a more comprehensive understanding of issues at their
boundaries that neither can address exclusively. See Barbour (1997:
77-98), Haught (1994: 9-26), and John Paul II (1988).
66
At the time of writing, texts are not yet available from the conference on
sustainability sponsored by the United Nations and held in
Johannesburg, South Africa in late August to early September 2002 to
check progress made since the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (1993) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992 during
which agreements were negotiated and enumerated under Agenda 21.
An earlier international endeavor to define the term “sustainability” is
the United Nations World Commission on Environment and
Development (1987).
67
Conversely, the “steward” model suggests the need for humans to manage
or take care of other species and ecological systems.
68
Leys (1995) provides an overview of the historical development of the
principle of subsidiarity. Verstraeten (1998) explores this principle in
relation to the notion of solidarity.
69
See essays in Raffensperger and Tickner (1999).
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